Prepare for the unexpected. New forms of attack will be unexpected in time, tactics and consequences and may include kinetic attacks on undersea cables and space infrastructure. 

Questions to Consider:
Does the organisation have a capacity to fast switch to other cloud, in-house server or hot site operations to limit recovery time? Are there diagnostics for sensors and control systems and the interface with operations?  Could a global security crisis in the South and East China Seas and flash points elsewhere (including Europe) target an organisation’s upstream cyber providers?  Other resilience tasks to check are:

• - Competent external recovery services;
• - Internal policies for real time back- up systems unconnected to live operations;
• - Financial resources for full re-build after ransomware;
• - Internal policies to avert ransomware payments; 
• - Cooperative recovery planning with industry peers;
• - Regular modular and  whole of organisation exercises;

 Nations signalling intent of conflict.
 Energy regeneration challenges.

Nuclear conflict and radiation incidents are a high risk for some regions.  Nations are engaging in
‘signalling’ capability of weapons and intent. The most frequent signals are coming from China in
relation to Taiwan; the USA in relation to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea; Russia in
sending Zircon hypersonic missiles onto naval voyages into the Atlantic, movement of nuclear
weapons to Belarus and threats to Ukraine; North Korea in frequency of missile tests including
submarine launched missiles and drones; and Iran’s apparent nuclear enrichment found to be at
84% purity.

Planning for Energy Regeneration Post Nuclear Conflict:
1. Hardened energy infrastructure;
2. Academic and Industry collaborative Programmes;
3. Small Modular Reactors built underground;
4. Supplemental critical control system separated from IOT; and
5. Energy planning for rail transportation of populations.